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Erica Goldring
The Rising Storm: How New Jersey Beach Replenishment Projects And Just Compensation
Are Not The Answers To The Water Management Crisis
Part I: Introduction
Property law is founded on concepts of stability, but the growth of hurricanes and flooding
on New Jersey beaches make coastal residential life unstable. To remedy this growing concern,
New Jersey implemented a public project to build sand dunes along the Jersey Shore. Since some
beachfront property owners would not voluntarily relinquish easements, the government has
“taken” land for sand dunes through its eminent domain power.

This spawned litigation

concerning the value of just compensation for the partial takings. In 2013, the New Jersey Supreme
Court created a new standard for partial takings compensation, which now allows juries to consider
not only the loss of value but also the benefits the sand dunes confer on property owners in the
form of storm protection. This new standard helps prevent windfalls to property owners, but also
promotes the government’s role in using structural mitigation techniques to “protect” against rising
sea levels and natural disasters. Scholars such as Daniel Barnhizer and Henk Ovink argue that this
is not enough: They contend that America must implement new forms of water management for
true long-term protection. Instead of revising compensation equations to save the government
short-term money, America must adapt to new ideas and policies of water management in the face
of ever increasing climate change.
A detailed inquiry into the interconnectedness of property law, land development, and
climate change is discussed in this note. Section I examines how natural disasters and resulting
government initiatives uproot our basic understandings of property law. Section II explains how
New Jersey’s response to recent hurricanes has created problems for coastal development and has
led to tug-of-war litigation between property owners and the government. Section III discusses
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how other countries are responding to inevitable rising sea levels and how America could benefit
from a new perspective on coastal land use. Finally, Section IV concludes.
Part II: A Theoretical Approach to Property Rights and the Effects of Natural Disasters
Environmental transformations resulting from sudden natural phenomena effectuate
changes in property law.1 Common characteristics shared by large-scale natural upheavals
include: (1) suddenness; (2) unexpectedness; (3) intense societal disruption and (4) vast geographic
extension.2 These factors are not all inclusive or dispositive; rather they are indicative of past
examples of “radically changed circumstances.”3 One effect of natural disasters on property law
concerns the relationships between property owners and shared or common resources.4
Since property law is founded on concepts of stability,5 the effects of natural disasters
present a challenge by imposing conditions of upheaval and unpredictability. 6 Often, these natural
disasters occur as the result of climate change, which is inherently uncertain.7 Property owners
may be faced with fear of losing resources that are central to a stable life.8
In the aftermath of a natural disaster, there are several repeat problems that property owners
tend to face. First, property owners may seek to preserve or conserve a common resource.9 They
will have to address difficult questions to determine the appropriate course of action.10 These
questions often involve allocation of responsibility, ability for resource improvement, consent
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John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REV. 463, 470 (2007).
Id. at 473.
3
Id. at 470.
4
Id. at 474.
5
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 538 (2005).
6
Lovett, supra note 1, at 476.
7
See generally JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 287 (2005) (discussing
how societies around the world have responded to dramatic environmental shifts).
8
Lovett, supra note 6.
9
Symeon C. Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of Co-Ownership: A Kommentar, 68 TUL. L. REV.
69, 113 (1993).
10
Lovett, supra note 1, at 481.
2
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among commoners, financial reimbursement, and default property law rules.11 Second, property
owners must contemplate and make decisions on whether substantial physical alterations or
improvements of common resources should occur due to changed environmental circumstances.12
Last, property owners are likely to address the effects of individuals’ exit and entrance from
property relationships.13 Embedded in these questions is the state’s role in facilitating functional
property relationships to uphold the public welfare. More specifically, the question is raised: What
is the extent of protection afforded to property regimes by federal disaster aid and disaster
protection laws?14
New natural disaster laws may help property owners move from a reactive approach to a
proactive one.15 In New Jersey, the devastation surrounding Superstorm Sandy in 2012 implicated
a host of restrictive provisions.16 For example, when New Jersey was deemed a “state of
emergency,” price gouging was prohibited and mandatory overtime restrictions for healthcare
personnel were lifted.17 But in the wake of the storm, New Jersey is now retrospectively regulating
against future natural disaster destruction.18 Specifically, flood prevention measures not agreed to
by coastal property owners have become a major public initiative backed by the State’s eminent
domain power.19
The taking of private property in post-hurricane recovery periods has widespread
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Id. at 482.
Id.
13
Id. at 482-83.
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Joshua F. Cheslow, The Future of the Law Four Practice Areas on the Horizon, NEW JERSEY LAWYER
MAGAZINE, August 2013, at 35, 36.
15
Id. at 35.
16
Id.
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Id. at 36.
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Id.
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Id.
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consequences to reshaping devastated areas.20 Though State condemnation power has been
deemed both constitutional and useful when exercised to benefit a public use, property owners
affected by natural disasters also desire a say in the policy that affects them.21
Part III: Beach Replenishment and Partial Takings
A. New Jersey’s Waterfront Evolution
New Jersey’s use of eminent domain power to carry out public beach replenishment
projects after Sandy stems from the State’s storm damage reduction initiative, beginning in 1999.22
Coastal municipalities, in collaboration with the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (“NJDEP”) and the United States Army Corps Engineers designed a project to combat
shoreline erosion along Long Beach Island.23 Efforts included pumping 11 million cubic yards of
sand into the area, with an additional two million cubic yards of sand every seven years for the
next 50 years, and construction of sand dunes with specific height restrictions based on the
locations.24 In order to build the dunes, voluntary easements were needed from coastal property
owners.25 For many beachfront residents, this property right was not easily relinquished and
caused municipalities to take legal action.26
In 2009, President Barack Obama enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
which provides extensive funding for science, engineering research, and infrastructure. 27 Within

20

Shelby C. Stone, Two Tales of One City: Eminent Domain Post-Katrina and A Response to Kelo, 53 LOY. L. REV.
115, 117 (2007).
21
Kevin Ramakrishna, Subduing the Ceaseless Storm: Breaking the Build-Destroy-Rebuild Cycle Following Major
Catastrophes Through Taxation and Responsibility, 2 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 328, 333 (2009).
22
Water Resources Development Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-53, 106th Cong. §§ 337–39 (1999).
23
NJDEP BUREAU OF COASTAL ENG’G, BEACH NOURISHMENT (2012).
24
NJ DEP’T OF ENG’R, BARNEGAT INLET TO LITTLE EGG INLET: FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT AND INTEGRATED FINAL
ENVTL IMPACT STATEMENT A (1999).
25
Id. at 1.
26
MaryAnn Spoto, Fight Against Emergency Beach Replenishment Causing Waves Among Shore Towns, NJ.COM
(Apr. 13, 2012, 8:04AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/04/emergency_beach_replenishment.html.
27

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 516 (2009).
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New Jersey’s share of the Act, the state government created its own New Jersey Recovery and
Reinvestment Plan, allocating $51,259,000 worth of public funding for beach replenishment
projects along the state’s coastline.28 Beach replenishment is a process that restores eroded
shorelines, but does not prevent future erosion.29 Therefore, beach replenishment projects are not
a long-term solution, particularly with the threat posed by rising sea levels.30 Under the New
Jersey Recovery and Reinvestment Plan, however, the State took a proactive approach, mandating
sand dune easements from private beachfront property owners as a condition precedent to
administering public funds.31
Although New Jersey’s plan specifies a fifty-year replenishment period, coastal property
owners recognize that continuous beach maintenance will extend far into the future.32 Beach
replenishment requires perpetually ongoing work to remain effective due to the natural forces of
wind, water, and land.33 As such, many attempts by State agencies to acquire private easements
have been unsuccessful due to concerns about declining property values and never-ending beach
construction and restoration. 34
In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy showed the New York Metropolitan Area the power of
wind and water.35 The storm peaked at one thousand miles wide and left fifty billion dollars in

28

NJ RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT PLAN, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, (2013), available at
http://www.nj.gov/recovery/infrastructure/acoe.html.
29
Don Barber, Beach Nourishment Basics, COASTAL GEOLOGY AT BRYN MAWR COLLEGE, available at
http://www.brynmawr.edu/geology/geomorph/beachnourishmentinfo.html.
30
Spoto, supra note 26.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Jessica Vantine & Tiffany B. Zezula, The Beach Zone: Using Local Land Use Authority to Preserve Barrier
Islands, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 309 (2002).
34
Lauren Wanko, Ship Bottom Residents Reluctant to Sign Easements to Build Dunes, NJ TODAY (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.njtvonline.org/njtoday/video/ship-bottom-residents-reluctant-to-sign-easements-to-build-sand-dunes/.
35
David M. Abramson & Irwin Redlener, Hurricane Sandy: Lessons Learned, Again, 6 DISASTER MEDICINE AND
PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS (4th ed. 2012),
file:///Users/ericagoldring/Downloads/Abramson_and_Redlener_Hurricane_Sandy_Lessons_Learned_Again_DMP
HP_2012.pdf.
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damages in the aftermath.36 Though other areas of the United States have experienced more
frequent, violent storms, the impact of Hurricane Sandy on one of the most populated areas in the
country made it the second costliest Atlantic hurricane in history.37 The devastating consequences
of natural resource depletion, destroyed homes, and lost lives facilitated the enactment of the
federal Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, which included the Sandy Recovery
Improvement Act (“SRIA”).38
SRIA allocated seventeen (17) billion dollars to federal agencies in immediate support to
the victims and communities damaged by Hurricane Sandy.39 The NJDEP, in turn, was given the
responsibility of acquiring the necessary property interests to carry out federal initiatives, including
sand dune easements along the beachfront.40 For property owners that did not voluntarily provide
easements, their property was to be “taken” under the authority of the Federal and New Jersey
Constitutions.
B. Personal Property and Doctrinal Roots
The 5th Amendment of the Federal Constitution states, “no person shall be…deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”41 Further, the New Jersey Constitution, the controlling authority
of the state, also provide that, “private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property
for public use without just compensation first made to the owners.”42 The Eminent Domain Act

36

Id.
Shaddick Enders & Brandi Kalena, Sand Politics: Coastal Dunes against Property Rights in Post-Superstorm
Sandy New Jersey, SETON HALL LAW EREPOSITORY (2014), http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/569.
38
Disaster Appropriations Act, H.R. 152, 113th Cong. (2013).
39
Id.
40
Margate City v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 1:14-cv-07303 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 24, 2014).
41
U.S. Const. amend. V, §2.
42
N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, § 20.
37
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of 1971, which further defines property as what can be loosely characterized as “real estate,”
provides a four-step condemnation process that applies to all eminent domain proceedings.43
Additionally, the Eminent Domain Act of 1971 proscribes the process for awarding just
compensation, which is a term that is not defined by either the Federal or State Constitutions.44 It
requires that redress granted to the property owner should reflect fair market value for a total taking
or diminution in fair market value to the remainder parcel for a partial taking.45
The constitutional norm of just compensation is in accordance with property law’s concepts
of stability. In 1215, the Magna Carta read, “No constable or other of our bailiffs shall take corn
or other chattels of any man without immediate payment, unless the seller voluntarily consents to
postponement of payment.”46 This clause denotes that compensation was expected when the King
took rations from the people.47 As history progressed, just compensation became a common
feature of government that evolved into an established common law principle.48 As such, scholars
have explained that the just compensation principle is grounded in natural law, identified by John
Locke as the rights to “life, liberty, and property.”49
C. Property’s Philosophical Framework
John Locke is among one of the most influential political thinkers of the modern period.50
His treatment of property is generally thought to be among his most important contributions in
political thought.51 To understand Locke’s concept of natural law, one must travel back into the

43

N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 (1971).
Id.
45
City of Ocean City v. Maffucci, 740 A.2d 640, 641 (N.J. App. Div. 1999).
46
James W. Ely, Jr., The Historical Context of Just Compensation: "Just Compensation" Does Not Necessarily
Mean "Fair Compensation," THE PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE LAWYER 9 (2014).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 10
50
Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2005),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/.
51
Id.
44
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state of nature.52

There, the governing law is that of reason, which bespeaks individual

preservation and sustainment of others.53 According to Locke, each person has a responsibility to
preserve mankind, so long as such efforts do not work against the individual himself.54 Locke’s
concept of preservation is premised on the notion of secure individual rights.55 Among these is
the right to property, something that is “justly” appropriated through self-ownership.56
To Locke, personal property is inextricably linked to the law of nature.57 Much of Locke’s
thinking in this area focuses on the importance of the earth as a whole, which he views as the
property of all the people in the world.58 It follows that Locke believes the earth must be justly
appropriated to ensure the collective benefit and survival of all individuals.59 As such, Locke
attempts to balance sustainability with personal property and ownership. 60 In Two Treatises on
Government, Locke wrote:
“The same law of Nature that does by this means give us property, does also
bound that property too . . . As much as any one can make use of to any advantage
of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor fix his property in. Whatever
is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others . . . . So that, in effect,
there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself. For he
that leaves as much as another can make use of does as good as take nothing at all.”
61

Though written in 1698, the pillars of Locke’s work remain relevant to property law today.62 When
exercising its eminent domain powers, the government often cites “public good” or “public

52

Paul J. Otterstedt, A Natural Rights Approach to Regulatory Takings, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 25, 31 (2002).
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (Peter Laslett ed.) (3rd ed. 1698).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property Law, LEXISNEXIS 21 (3rd ed. 2012).
53
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necessity” as a socially accepted justification for use of its sovereign power.63

Thus, the

government’s check on individual property, when used to the detriment of others, mirrors Locke’s
rhetorical question that asks, “ . . . May [anyone] engross [the earth] as much as he will? To which
I answer, Not so.”64 Despite the individualist school of thought that one has the right to do with
her property as she wishes, the personal right to property must compromise with the environmental
interests of the community.65 Just compensation attempts to strike such a balance by protecting
individuals from bearing public the burdens of climate change and natural accretion.66
D. Governmental Restrictions on Access to Private Property: Just Compensation
While the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions guarantee just compensation, or fair value,
for any property taken, the more tumultuous issue often arising is whether the valuation method
used to derive a monetary amount affords the litigant due process or unjust enrichment.67 It is well
established that valuation methods in partial takings of easements are more complex than when
dealing with an entire taking.68 New Jersey courts have generally followed one of two computation
formulas: The “’Per Se’ Rule” or the “Before and After Rule.”69 The Per Se rule adds the market
value of the land taken to the difference between the value of the remainder before and after the
taking [Value of land taken + (value of remainder area before taking – value of remainder area
after taking) = just compensation].70 The Before and After Rule merely computes damages as the
difference between the value of the entire parcel before the taking and the remainder after the

63

Nasim Farjad, Condemnation Friendly or Land Use Wise? A Broad Interpretation of the Public Use Requirement
Works Well for New York City, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1121 (2007).
64
Locke, supra note 57.
65
John T. Vaughan III, Just Compensation or Unjust Enrichment? Critiquing Attempts to Circumvent State
Sovereignty in Regulatory Takings Law, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 324 (2001).
66
Id. at 345.
67
Robert C. Downie, II, Quasi - Judicial Proceedings and Constitutional Rights: What Is Happening to Separation
of Powers?, FLA. B.J., 44, 45 (1997).
68
21 N.J. Prac., Skills And Methods § 37:14 (3d ed.) (West 2015).
69
Id.
70
Id.
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taking [Value of entire parcel before taking – value of remainder parcel after taking = just
compensation].71 Under both formulas, testimony of a real estate appraisal expert is required.72
There are, however, a variety of limitations to awarding just compensation.
Relevant to the issue of just compensation is the evidence of current and prospective uses
of a partially condemned property.73 A real estate appraisal expert must consider both the use of
the property at the time of the condemnation and its “highest and best use.”74

However,

“[e]lements affecting value that depend upon events or combinations of occurrences which, while
within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be reasonably probable, should be excluded
from consideration, for that would allow mere speculation and conjecture to become a guide for
the ascertainment of value . . .”75 The highest and best use of a parcel must be considered under
the applicable zoning regulations and typically reflect the legal value of the highest dollar
amount.76
Prior to 2013, New Jersey law was well settled as to the benefits that could offset just
compensation. General benefits, which are benefits produced by partial condemnation and shared
in common with all other property owners in the area, could not affect an award of damages.77
Special benefits, however, are benefits that accrue “directly and proximately” to the remainder
parcel and are unique to the individual property owner.78 This distinction between general and
special benefits previously prevented juries from hearing testimony about the benefits provided by

71

Id.
Maffaucci, 740 A.2d at 638.
73
Mark S. Dennison, Probable Zoning Change As Bearing On Proof Of Market Value In Eminent Domain
Proceeding, 40 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 395 (West 2016).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Dennison, supra note 73.
72
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partial takings implementing storm surge protection.79
E. The Turning Point: Harvey Cedars and Beyond
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan
set a new valuation standard in partial takings cases.80 There, the Court held that just compensation
must be based upon a consideration of “all relevant, reasonably calculable, and non-conjectural
factors that either decrease or increase the value of the remaining property.”81 The issue in Karan
concerned a partial condemnation proceeding against one of sixteen holdouts that refused to give
the State a voluntary easement for sand dune construction across a Long Beach Island home.82
The property-owners argued that the sand dune obstructed their panoramic oceanfront view, which
decreased the market value of their coastal residence.83 The Borough, however, argued that the
landowners obtained a benefit from the added storm protection that must be calculated into their
compensation award.84
The trial court found that the sand dune construction did not confer a special benefit to
defendants, but rather a general benefit that protected Long Beach Island and its inhabitants from
the “destructive impact of hurricanes and nor’easters.”85 As such, the jury awarded the Karans
$375,000 in damages.86 The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the loss of oceanfront view
was compensable and significantly reduced the market value of the property. 87 Additionally, the
new sand dune would occupy a strip of the Karan’s private beach property, resulting in loss of

79

Id.
Borough of Harvery Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (2013).
81
Id. at 527.
82
Id. at 527-28.
83
Id. at 530.
84
Id.
85
Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 40 A.3d 75, 77 (N.J. App. Div. 2012) rev’d, 70 A.3d 524 (2013).
86
Id.
87
Id.
80
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recreational use.88 Citing to decade old New Jersey precedent, the Appellate Division followed
City of Ocean City v. Maffucci in holding that “ocean view, beach access, use and privacy are
fundamental considerations in valuing beachfront property.”89
In Karan, the central question for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether the formula
used by the courts below, which does not permit consideration of quantifiable benefits resulting
from partial condemnation to increase the value of the remainder property, reflects the owner’s
true loss.90 The high court disagreed, finding that the new sand dune conferred unique storm
protection on the Karans.91 This departure from the historical valuation approach used by the
lower courts reflects a dramatic change in eminent domain compensation. Ultimately, the Karans
settled for a symbolic one dollar ($1.00) for their loss.92 The decision in Karan implicates a new
standard that now allows juries to hear a broader scope of evidence, drastically affecting the
outcome of subsequent sand dune partial takings cases by lowering the compensation awards.
Shortly after the seminal Karan decision, the New Jersey Appellate Division published two
back-to-back appeals in Petrozzi v. City of Ocean City.93 Although not a condemnation case,
Petrozzi made clear that Karan’s departure from the general versus special benefits approach to
partial valuation would not be easily limited. In Petrozzi, Ocean City sought a proactive approach
to storm surge protection and beach replenishment.94 But rather than exercising its power of
eminent domain, the City acquired voluntary easements for sand dunes from Ocean City’s property
owners through use of a height restriction.95 The “easement agreements” were premised on the

88

Id.
Id. quoting Malffucci, 740 A.2d at 641.
90
Karan, 70 A.3d at 527.
91
Id. at 532.
92
Scott Salmon, Necessary Change: Recalculating Just Compensation for Environmental Benefits, 6 WASH. & LEE
J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV'T 552, 581 (2015).
93
Petrozzi v. City of Ocean City, 78 A.3d 998 (N.J. App.Div. 2013).
94
Id. at 1002.
95
Id. at 1002-03.
89
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condition that the sand dune would not impede the landowners’ coastal view.96 Natural accretion,
however, unsurprisingly caused the sand dunes to grow in size, exceeding their initial
conformance.97 When the property owners’ showed concern over the dune’s enlargement, they
learned that since their initial assent to the easement agreement, New Jersey had implemented the
Coastal Area Facility Review Act (“CAFRA”).98 This statute required that the City get permission
from the NJDEP before maintaining or reducing dune elevation.99 Subsequently, the City’s request
for the necessary permit was denied by NJDEP due to “non compliance with government
regulations.”100 This resulted in the landowners filing suit against Ocean City, alleging that the
easement agreements were breached due to loss of beachfront view, access, and privacy.101
The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded compensation for loss of
view.102 The Appellate Division, however, remanded the case back to the trial court.103 In doing
so, it instructed that, “the fixing of an appropriate restitutionary amount must consider the value
of that which plaintiffs have been deprived, including loss of, or interference with, their ocean
views due to the accretive effects. But offset against the burdens suffered by plaintiffs are the
potential gains conferred by the partial consideration performed by Ocean City to date, namely the
non-speculative, reasonably calculable benefits arising from the municipality’s dune project.”104
Thus, Petrozzi evidences the broadly precedential effect of the Karan valuation formula created
by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
About a year after the Appellate Division decided Petrozzi, it was clear that the scope and

96

Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1003.
98
Petrozzi, 78 A.3d at 1003.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1007.
97
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application of the new valuation approach would extend down to New Jersey trial courts. In
Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Groisser, defendants sought an $800,000 award for the
government’s partial condemnation of their property to create a sand dune easement.105
Specifically, the Groissers argued that the easement was worth approximately $200,000, while
their damages for loss of view was worth $600,000.106 Prior to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
holding in Karan, an Ocean County Superior Court jury awarded the plaintiffs $265,000.107 But
after applying the new Karan standards and weighing the potential increase in property value
resulting from the dune’s insulation, the Groissers were awarded a mere $300 on remand.108
Acting Attorney General John J. Hoffman called the verdict “an important legal win for the state’s
beachfront property efforts, for our vital natural resources along the coast, and for the citizens of
New Jersey. . .”109 Clearly, the tide had turned on coastal residents.
Part IV: New Approaches to Water Management: Moving Away from Sand Dunes and the
Compensation Conundrum
A. Land Use Management: Moving Away from Water
Though it appears that the new valuation approach will prevent windfalls to property
owners and further the public coastal replenishment initiative, some scholars suggest that these
efforts produce latent difficulties. Professor Daniel D. Barnhizer of Harvard University believes
that current governmental responses to rising sea levels will not ultimately diminish flood

105

Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Groisser, No. L-001429-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. June 24, 2014).
Patricia A. Miller, Harvey Cedars Couple Sought $800,000 For Dune Easement, Jury Awards $300, BARNAGETMANAHAWKIN PATCH (July 1, 2014, 2:06PM), http://patch.com/new-jersey/barnegat-manahawkin/harvey-cedarscouple-sought-800000-for-dune-easement-jury-awards-300.
107
Donna Weaver, Jury Awards Harvey Cedars Couple $300 For Easement To Complete Dune Project, THE PRESS
OF ATLANTIC CITY (June 30, 2014, 5:30PM), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/breaking/jury-awardsharvey-cedars-couple-for-easement-to-complete-dune/article_d0ba717a-009d-11e4-bf66-0019bb2963f4.html.
108
Id.
109
Statement of John J. Hoffman, N.J. Att’y Gen., N.J. Wins Another Cheap Easement of Beach Dune Project, LAW
360 (Sept. 22, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://law360.com/articles/553508/nj-wins-another-cheap-easement-for-beachdune-project.
106
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damages.110 Rather, he argues that, over the next 20 years approximately 26 million people will
become seaside property residents under the mistaken belief that their homes are shielded from
natural disasters by government protection mechanisms.111 Currently, over half of the American
population lives in coastal counties that amount to only seventeen percent of habitable land.112
Little do they know, government action such as beach replenishment projects and partial
condemnation for sand dune easements have unintended consequences that actually increase
potential beachfront damage.113
It is well established that flooding is the leading cause of natural disaster damage in the
United States.114 However, such damage would not exist without human development in the
floodplains.115 Floodplains are defined as
“uniquely impermanent and changeable landforms, subject to destruction or
catastrophic alteration through erosion during flood events. Oceanfront property. .
.is eroding constantly and hundreds of feet of beach may disappear in a single
storm. Compared to “dry” real estate that remains permanently in place and
responds only to tectonic forces, floodplains are not “real land,” but rather may
disappear under the property owner’s feet at any time.”116
Despite this, over 50% of the American population lives within 50 miles of the coast.117
This increasing ratio does not explain how beachfront property owners understand and deal
with the uncertainties of flood damage. Though property law and self-ownership depend on
concepts of stability,118 it appears that beachfront homeowners are not concerned with changing

110

Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private Property Interests on the Coasts,
27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 374 (2003).
111
Id.
112
Kelley M. Jancaitis, Florida on the Coast of Climate Change: Responding to Rising Seas, 31 ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
J. 157, 191 (2008).
113
Barnhizer, supra note 110.
114
Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 62
(1985).
115
Barnhizer, supra note 110.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Lovett, supra note 1, at 476.
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weather patterns, rising sea levels, and global warming.119

What is the reason for this

inconsistency? “Givings,” defined as government actions that increase the value of private
property, may be the answer to individuals’ false sense of shelter. 120 In the context of coastal
protection, givings encompass sand replenishment projects like those discussed in Karan, Petrozzi,
and Groisser.121 These public projects are known as “structural mitigation” responses to flooding,
which are mechanisms designed to prevent or reverse erosion of the floodplain.122 Two of the
primary issues related to structural mitigation givings like sand dunes include (1) who should retain
the increased value to private property, and (2) when can the government force owners to pay or
forego compensation for the measureable benefits of givings.123

These questions must be

considered in the context of the Karan valuation standard and subsequent cases that follow the
new damages formula.
Sand dunes are structural mitigation givings in two ways: they are “direct givings” and
“fiat givings.”124 Sand dunes offer beach armor and are considered a “direct giving” because they
counteract the dangerous effects of flood damage through soft barriers.125 In turn, property owners
underestimate the danger of flood risks under the misconception that they are protected from water
damage entirely.126 Due to these beliefs, property values for coastal properties rise as a result of
government’s structural mitigation techniques.127
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relationship between land values and flood risk.128 Sand dunes are also considered fiat givings
because property owners believe they have the government’s guarantee that their property will
continue to exist.129 Fiat givings are “givings that result where the government declares . . . that it
will not permit a floodplain landowner’s property to move, erode, or disappear. By declaring its
intent to guard floodplain properties against future encroachments by nature, government has in
effect created ‘dry’ land by fiat . . . .” backed by the full faith and credit of the federal or state
government . . .””130 There is “government-created reliance that the existing state of [protection]
will be maintained.”131
The categorization of sand dunes as “direct” and “fiat” givings begs the question whether
the government must pay for these self-created givings when they purchase or take private property
for public use.132 In other words, will government have to pay for increased value that it has
created? Although givings, like ecosystems, are extremely difficult to value monetarily, it appears
that New Jersey has taken the position that government should not have to pay increased costs for
implementing conservation structures. This is reflected by the new just compensation valuation
approach initially established in Karan.
One of the primary justifications for creating a new valuation standard in Karan was that
“homeowners are entitled to the fair market value of their loss, not to a windfall, not to a pay out
that disregards the home’s enhanced value resulting from a public project.” 133 Aside from
concerns about property owners’ unjust enrichment for sand dune easements, hefty compensation
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for government flood responses may distort market reactions to flood risks.134 This reinforces
market misconceptions about residential development of floodplains and discourages property
owners’ independent use of protective measures.135 “Additionally, overcompensation further
shifts the risk of flood losses to taxpayers, requiring them to subsidize the decisions of floodplain
property owners at even greater rates.”136 All together, these factors require government entities
to continue maintaining and building structural flood controls.137 But as Professor Barnhizer
points out, more beachfront residential ownership is induced by dune creation that sends the
message that ownership is safe and secure.138
To combat the perpetual problem of costly flood damages, Professor Barnhizer argues that
a land use management approach, rather than a structural mitigation approach, is most
appropriate.139 Land use management is a proactive, non-crisis focused decision-making process
that focuses on current and future floodplain occupation.140

This method maximizes the

economically beneficial use of floodplains while minimizing the economic loss related to human
residential development.141 Although this strategy is best implemented before the expanse of
coastal homes is as far-reaching as it is today, a modified exercise of land use management must
be applied in place of current structural mitigation techniques that are unsustainable.142 A recent
study indicates that a quarter of all homes within 500 feet of the coast will be subject to shoreline
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erosion and flooding within the next sixty years.143 However, before attempting an effective land
management plan, the proper regulations and economic incentives must be put into place to start
to change the American way of thinking about residential development and investment.144
Significant changes suggested by Professor Barnhizer include (1) public acquisition of floodplain
property; (2) government compensation for property owners’ legitimate expectations, not
“givings” attributable to government flood response; and (3) government must establish a federal
property acquisition program aimed at high-risk or environmentally valuable floodplain
properties.145
These proposed reforms should begin with immediate prohibitions to residential flood plan
development through land use restrictions such as zoning and police power regulations.146
Although these regulations may be authorized by statute, the public-trust doctrine and ancient
nuisance law serve as alternate justifications.147 The public-trust doctrine requires that the state
hold its coastal resources in a perpetual trust for the public benefit.148 Though this doctrine
originally meant to preserve the shorelines for navigation, commerce, and public recreation, “there
is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands . . . is
the preservation of those lands in their natural state.”149 The trust attaches to the coast, wherever it
moves.150 Thus, as sea levels rise and coastal properties are flooded, the public-trust doctrine
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requires that private property give way to shoreline erosion.151 Moreover, sand dunes and other
structural mitigation techniques run the risk of impeding on this common law principle. By
artificially preventing the tide from moving freely, the public is being denied its reversionary trust
interest in the beach.152
Basic nuisance principals also support coastal property regulation changes. According to
the Restatement, “[a] public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public . . . . Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public
right is unreasonable include . . . whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a
permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant
effect upon a public right.”153 This definition could easily encompass current coastal problems,
including both residential overdevelopment and sand dune storm “protection.” By recognizing
particular harms such as increased erosion, visual blight, loss of beachfront, and the creation of
physically hazardous flood risks, the suggested prohibitions on coastal development align with the
goals of common law nuisance.
By grounding coastal land development regulation in the public trust doctrine and basic
nuisance principles, the government will be immunized from constitutional takings challenges.154
Though some property rights activists have suggested that courts unfairly impose these common
law doctrines against private property interests, history shows us that the public trust doctrine is
inherent in the chain of title of all New Jersey properties that boarder waterways. 155 “It is not an
imposition on the property owner but part of the nature of his or her property.”156 Therefore, the

151

Id.
Id. at 554.
153
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1979).
154
Caldwell & Segall, supra note 148, at 553.
155
Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, "Waterlocked": Public Access to New Jersey's Coastline, 34 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 579, 585 (2007).
156
Caldwell & Segall, supra note 148, at 568.
152

20

government has the freedom to take a direct approach to preventing development in the dangerous
floodplains.157 James Titus, a scholar on the rising sea level, has advocated for the merits of rolling
conservation easements to prohibit flood control structures like sand dunes.158 The idea behind
rolling easements is that since it is unrealistic to prevent coastal development altogether, an
alternative is to allow development with the conscious understanding that land will be abandoned
when and if the sea level rises enough to submerge it.159 This is a way of averting or mitigating
prospective violations of the public trust doctrine or public nuisances. In stark contrast to the
easements perpetuated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and taken in Karan, these rolling
easements are intended to counter the false sense of coastal property protection resulting from
current government givings. Without dunes and other structural mitigation forms, flood damage
will occur naturally and the risk factor will be directly reflected in the beachfront residential
housing market.160 As such, concerns about government condemnation discussed in Karan and
beyond will no longer exist, and the market will adjust to the natural and inevitable future of rising
seas.
States like Maine, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas currently regulate their
shorelines through rolling easements.161 In these states, the government holds an easement that
allows for beachfront development on the condition that, if the sea rises to dangerous levels, the
structure will be removed.162 This “build at your own risk” approach puts landowners on notice
that the future of their coastal properties is unpredictable, but like the changing climate, carry an
inevitable fate.
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Not surprisingly, aspects of land use management have roots in national policy initiatives.
Specifically, the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”), a congressional declaration of
national policy, mandates that states protect their natural resources and manage shoreline
development to minimize loss of life and property.163 Though this policy has not been widely
acknowledged in New Jersey, other states have taken steps in a direction likely to gain the approval
of Professor Barnhizer and other coastal management proponents. Nagshead, North Carolina, for
example, has adopted a land development moratorium following natural disasters.164 There, during
the thirty days following a disaster, zoning laws and disaster mitigation strategies may be adopted
in response to the changing environment.165 All subsequent land use development must comply
with these new standards.166 Similarly, environmentalists in Maine are concerned with protecting
their shorelines.167

Unlike New Jersey’s active use of structural mitigation techniques as

protections for beachfront development, Maine’s Coastal Sand Dunes Law (“MCSDL”) is highly
precautionary.168 The MCSDL requires that before new structures are built on the coast, there
must be accountability for environmental concerns including sea level rise, changing shorelines,
and wildlife habitat.169 And unlike New Jersey’s efforts to rebuild the damage caused by Hurricane
Sandy in the same manner as before, Maine requires permits and approvals to relocate and rebuild
structures severely damaged by natural disasters.170
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B. Designing With Water, Not Against It
In considering the proper techniques for a new land use management initiative, it may be
reasonable to look to the Netherlands’ approach to water management. Unlike America, Europe
has focused on climate change as a major public concern for more than a decade. 171 As such, the
Dutch have already radically adapted their infrastructure to the rising seas.172 Because
approximately half of the Netherlands lies below sea level,173 it has developed a communal society
of flood planning in every region.174 Not only are three out of every five Dutch citizens living at
or below sea level, but two-thirds of products in the Dutch economy are produced in areas
threatened by such climate change.175 In fact, the Dutch motto is “Water should get space before
it takes it!,” which may be attributable to a governmental public relations campaign called
“Nederland left met water” (“The Netherlands lives with water”.) 176 In contrast to the American
system of individualism, Dutch cities do not have the autonomy given to American municipalities
by way of unique protection mechanisms.177 Rather, Dutch water management and the finance
system behind it are highly decentralized and focus on adaptation.178 The Dutch are now using
innovative building techniques such as the construction of floating houses and office buildings,
and digging craters that will act as storage for runoff.179 Additionally, the Dutch have included
water management as a central feature to their urban development plans.180 For example, Dutch
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cities are building reservoirs under their parking garages as a way of guarding against flood
risks.181 And according to the European Commission, the Dutch factor in both environmental and
resource costs to the cost of water services.182 Much of this forward thinking water management
is attributable to the director of the Netherland’s Office of Spatial Planning and Water
Management, Henk Ovink.183
Ovink believes that water management is something that American culture does not yet
grasp.184 Policy-makers and environmentalists are more focused on preventing global warming
than planning for its effects.185 After observing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers rebuild storm
walls and dunes destroyed by Hurricane Sandy, he questioned why America continues to use the
same flood protection mechanisms that have already failed.186 This is a high-risk, low-utility
practice of coastal development.187 Rather, Ovink sees the acceptance of climate change is a new
way of life.188 In an effort to harness new energy from a range of innovative thinkers, he created
a competition called “Rebuild by Design,” which allowed experts to redevelop areas of flood
damage.”189

Among a plethora of “Dutch-like” ideas, the competitors imagined ways to

decentralize electricity and utilities, which allows homes to sustain a storm.190 Another idea called
for a U shape of parks and retraction walls around lower Manhattan. 191 For New Jersey beach
towns, the experts imagined a total upgrade of water storage capabilities and different dunes and
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sea barriers.192 In Hoboken, Ovink encouraged vegetation on roofs to soak up rainwater and
permeable sidewalks.193 Additionally, his experts are working on a “mesh network” of Wi-Fi as a
new communication system.194 In the face of a new water management crisis, the Dutch system
of regional planning may be attractive to Americans that foresee the danger of the upcoming
storms.
IV. Conclusion
Rather than perpetuating the current coastal water management system, there must be a
total restructuring of America’s understanding of flood risk and protection. Instead of fighting the
earth’s natural progression of rising sea levels, civilization must find away to conform to it. This
requires a closer integration of American branches of government, a hierarchical planning
structure, and the attachment of funds to adaptation and climate-focused planning opportunities.195
Property ownership rests in concepts of stability and individual rights, but our current conservation
projects will never exist in harmony with individual residents. Until a new plan is implemented,
the government will continue to counter beach erosion by taking or using property easements for
flood structures. This country is seeking new legislation and policy initiatives that are forward
thinking towards water management, rather than putting resources towards unnecessary litigation
like Karan. By changing the standards for just compensation, the government has found a way to
conserve funds and prohibit property owners “unjust enrichment.”

But with a new water

management system, the government will be able to create a system that is sustainable and realistic,
ultimately saving far more money than the ambiguous compensation scheme debuted in Karan.
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